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ABSTRACT 
The aim of the article is to provide a comparative analysis of the factors behind citizens’ specific tax 
burden preferences between New and Old EU Member States. Based on the available data from 
International Social Survey Programme for years 2006 and 2016, we form two groups of countries: 
Old Europe – Germany, Denmark, France, Spain, Finland and Sweden – and New Europe – Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Latvia, Hungary and Croatia. Initial inspection of the preferences for more 
progressive taxation shows that in most countries, citizens would prefer the higher redistributive role 
of the state and there are no clear-cut differences between Old and New Europe. Analysis of factors 
contributing to individuals’ preferences for progressive taxation provided interesting insights: older 
cohorts in New Europe are not disproportionally inclined to progressive taxation; political orientation 
and union membership are more important in Old than in New Europe; and there are no significant 
changes in the patterns resulting from the latest financial crisis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 1990s were marked by the transition of former socialists economies. As European 
transition economies also declared their intentions to join the European Union, the 
transformation towards established market mechanisms and the ability to function on the 
European common market began. The initial assumption was that the role of the government 
would diminish and the citizens’ demand for government interventions would decline. Recent 
studies suggest that pre-tax inequality was lower in Eastern Europe, but increasing rapidly 
with the transformation process [1]. Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln [1] argue that 
redistribution through taxes and transfers was lower in Eastern Europe socialist system as a 
consequence of price and wage restrictions that were the main redistribution mechanisms. The 
open question remains how the citizens have reacted to the changes and whether there are still 
commonalities in the perception of the role of government among post-transition economies 
or they converged to Old Europe. 
The public goods from the perspective of citizens entail two sides of a coin: gain and loss. To 
yield benefits from health, education, security and other government services, citizens have to pay 
taxes. Extant studies confirm differences in the size of the welfare state, fiscal stance, tax burden 
as well as tax compliance across European economies. As the countries develop different welfare 
systems, their citizens develop differentiated preferences. However, along with developing 
differentiated preferences for the welfare system, citizens develop different preferences 
towards progressive taxation of incomes. Behind different preferences for taxation, numerous 
factors are influencing an individual’s attitudes, including the socioeconomic and 
demographic factors as well as preferences for government intervention in different aspects (e.g. 
education, health and security). 
There are three specific research questions that we want to address. The first research question 
asks if, within a group of countries, different factors predict whether a person will have 
preferences for more progressive taxation in the period after the 2008 crisis in comparison to 
the pre-crisis period. The second research question, based on the analysis between two groups 
of countries, aims to identify whether personal characteristics, important for predicting a 
certain level of taxation, are similar between Old and New Europe. We explore two different 
periods – 2006 and 2016. Although the period is relatively short for significant convergence in 
attitudes to occur, it enables discussion of the 2008 crisis effects on the possible changes in 
the preferences of New and Old Europe citizens, thus consisting third research question. 
We aim to offer the following contributions. First, we provide more recent evidence on the 
evolution of tax preferences in post-transition countries, thus expanding the findings of 
Dallinger [2], Redmond, et al. [3] and Suhrcke [4]. Second, while previous research has 
documented differences between post-transition economies [5], there is a lack of comparison 
with developed European market economies. 
The article adopts the following structure. Next section briefly reviews the literature on the 
preferences for income redistribution and tax burden. Data and methodology are presented in 
section 3, while the results of the analysis are presented in section 4. Section 5 contains 
discussion and implication of the results, while the last section offers conclusions and a 
roadmap for future research. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
World economies are faced with exacerbating economic inequalities which are, for the time 
being, the lowest in Europe and the highest in the Middle East [6]. Although income 
inequalities have increased virtually in all countries, the speed of the increase varies. On the 
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one hand, in the European Union, income inequality has grown moderately [7]. On the other hand, 
since the 1980s, the largest increase of income inequalities has been recorded in China, India, 
Russia and North America. The issue of income redistribution has attracted much attention 
from researchers, policy-makers and global public. Alesina and Rodrik [8] and Persson and 
Tabellini [9] noted an inverse correlation between inequality and growth. Rodrik [10] 
additionally argues that economic growth alone may be insufficient to solve the problem of 
inequality. Hence growth policy should be enhanced with redistributive measures so that the 
results of economic growth are more evenly distributed [11].  
Alesina and Giuliano [12] find that preferences for redistribution are determined by personal 
characteristics such as age, gender, race and socioeconomic status. However, they are also a 
product of history, culture, political ideology and a perception of fairness. The authors also 
find that preferences for redistribution vary substantially across countries and show that these 
differences could be the result of differences in religion, histories of macroeconomic volatility 
and more generally defined culture. George [13] finds that individuals’ preferences for 
redistribution are not easily modelled by their perceived impact on their position in the 
income distribution, while Charite et al. [14] find that individuals display reference-dependent 
preferences. Lockwood and Weinzierl [15] show how the presence of preference 
heterogeneity affects the optimal extent of income redistribution.  
The shape of the income distribution should be crucial in the determination of policies with 
redistributive components (such as social security, health care, government transfers and 
taxation). However, Cruces et al. [16] find evidence of significant biases in individuals’ 
evaluations of their relative position in the distribution. Eventually, misperceptions about the 
income distribution affect attitudes towards redistribution.  
Redistribution refers to both the way the funds (taxes and social contributions) are collected 
(progressivity of the tax system) and the way they are allocated (social transfers). Hence, 
redistributive policies are influenced by a complex set of factors that determine public 
expenditures and revenues, while existing studies suggest that this ratio is not constant across 
the countries. Preferences for welfare state are not independent of attitudes towards taxation [17]. 
Ross [18] argues that fiscal preferences are driven by the tax burden relative to the goods and 
services the government provides. Barnes [19] suggests that preferences over tax levels have a 
greater effect on progressivity preferences in less progressive tax systems. Although social 
welfare is larger if the distribution of wealth and income are less concentrated, policy-makers 
must be aware that redistributive taxes and transfers could discourage incentives to work, save 
and earn income [20]. Regarding tax policy, Diamond and Saez [20] suggest that high earners 
should be subject to high and rising marginal tax rates on earnings while the earnings of 
low-income families should be subsidized. Moreover, the authors argue that capital income 
should be taxed, challenging arguments given by Atkinson and Stiglitz [21], Chamley [22] and 
Judd [23].  
In the EU countries the overall tax burden, as a percentage of GDP, has been increasing and 
the European Commission [24] especially points out that the tax burden on labor is relatively 
high if compared to the other advanced economies. For example, total tax wedge between the 
labor costs to the employer and the corresponding net take-home pay for single workers 
without children at average earnings levels in the EU Member States that are also the OECD 
members was 41,9 % in 2019, while in the rest of the OECD countries tax wedge was 26,7 % [25]. 
The difference is smaller in our two subsamples – tax wedge in Old Europe was 42,6 %, while 
in New Europe (excluding Croatia) it was 43,7 % [25]. 
Taxes on labor income are the largest source of public revenue in the EU. However, the 
structure of taxation differs between the Member States with consumption taxes having a 
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markedly higher share in public revenues in new Member States such as Croatia and Bulgaria. 
The rising tax burden is closely connected to the expansion of public sector commitments to 
welfare provision [26]. Evolution of public expenditures, especially health expenditures [27]. 
has a strong impact on redistribution.  
European Union today is a mixture of advanced western European countries and countries that 
until the 1990s had a socialist system, which implies that differences in tax burden preferences 
might have been significant before and at the beginning of the transition period. Socialist 
system’s characteristic was proclaimed egalitarian, which implies that differences between high 
and low salaries were lower than in capitalist western European countries. Redmond et al. [3] 
report that the Gini coefficient in the 1980s was lower in CEE countries than in Western 
European countries. Further, the socialist system offered a wide range of programs that helped 
citizens in economic difficulties [28]. Hence, tastes for redistribution in these countries have 
been shaped by specific country experience and tradition [29]. Indeed, during the 1990s, 
post-socialist countries were still different from developed Western European countries in the 
support for income distribution. Dallinger [2], Redmond et al. [3] and Suhrcke [4] use data from 
1999 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and find that in post-socialist countries 
support for redistribution is significantly higher than in Western European countries which have 
more conservative political regimes. Lipsmeyer [28] concludes that during mid-1990’s 
post-socialist countries still retained part of welfare preferences and attitudes of the socialist 
past. Okulicz-Kozaryn [30] suggests that this is related to the lack of upward mobility and 
relatively generous welfare systems under the previous regime, general path dependencies of 
public policies, and increased risk aversion due to the series of macroeconomic volatilities these 
societies experienced. 
Still, the transition from a socialist system to market economy included extensive market-
oriented reforms, accompanied by the diminishing influence of the state and opening up to 
foreign trade and investments [31]. Hence, it should not come as a surprise if by now New 
member states managed to become more similar to Old EU members in tax burden preferences, 
although post-transition economies are not a homogenous group [5]. The question remains 
whether factors behind tax burden preferences are similar in New and Old member states.  Even 
though factors of tax burden preferences are well researched [32, 33] the differences between 
New and Old Europe remain relatively neglected topic in the literature. Hence, the rest of the 
article is devoted specifically to this issue. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
We rely on the International Social Survey Programme 2006
1
 and 2016 data
2
, in which 
individual-level preferences for different aspects of the role of government were surveyed in 48 
countries. Alesina et al. [34] recently remind about stereotypically documented views on 
differences between Americans and Europeans in preferences for redistribution. Our focus in 
the present article is on the EU countries, due to the underlying assumption that the EU 
integration process leads to harmonisation in different areas. This is the reason why we further 
distinguish between the Old European member states and New European member states. We 
included all EU countries for which data were available in the ISSP for both years. Among the 
countries of Old Europe, we include Germany, Denmark, France, Spain, Finland and Sweden. 
Among the New European countries, we include the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Latvia, 
Hungary and Croatia.  
The preferences for tax burden can be quite different from the actual distribution of the taxes. 
Some people might find that more progressive distribution is fairer, while others could be 
against this. The average opinion of the population may not be reflected in the actual 
distribution of the taxes, depending on the overall importance the tax system has in public 
debates. To capture the attitudes towards progressiveness of the taxes imposed, we follow the 
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approach proposed by Barnes [19] based on the ISSP survey question. Specifically, respondents 
were asked to assess on a 5-point Likert scale (1 – much too low, …, 5 – much too high) the tax 
burden for the low, median and high-income population. The respondents’ assessments of the 
tax burden were grouped into three categories – low (much too low and low), medium and high 
(high and much too high). Based on the answers provided for all three income categories, 
respondents were grouped into those in favor of more progressive taxation and others. The 
procedure yields 27 different preferences profiles. Each preference profile depicts the 
respondent’s preferences for each of the income group. Respondents were categorized as more in 
favour of progressive taxation if they belong to one of the following profiles: LHH (high-income 
households are taxed too low, middle-income households are taxed too high, low-income 
households are taxed too high), LRH (high-income households are taxed too low, middle-income 
right, low-income high), RHH (high-income households are taxed right, middle-income 
households are taxed high, low-income households are taxed high), RRH (high-income 
households are taxed right, middle-income households are taxed right, low-income 
households are taxed high), LRR (high-income households are taxed low, middle-income are 
taxed right, low-income are taxed right), LLH (high-income households are taxed low, 
middle-income are taxed low, low-income are taxed high) and LLR (high-income households are 
taxed low, middle-income households are taxed low, low-income households are taxed right). 
Figure 1 shows citizens preferences for more progressive taxation in Old and New Europe. It 
can be noticed that in most countries (except for Denmark and France), respondents are in 
favor of more progressive taxation. The data clearly shows that there are no standard 
Old-New Europe differences in patterns. Rather, the assessments are more likely to be under 
the influence of general taxation policy in each country. The data for 2016 also corroborates 
such findings: in Old Europe, 7,3 % of respondents consider that taxes are overall too high, 
while this share in New Europe rises to 14,4 %. 
From the data presented in Figure 1, we can also notice that support for more progressive 
taxation has increased in almost all the countries after the 2008 economic crisis. There are two 
 
Figure 1. Preferences for more progressive taxation, in percentage of the total number of 
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exceptions – Croatia and France, where the share of respondents in favor of more progressive 
taxation has decreased. The initial inspection of the data, thus, does not suggest that 
post-transition economies are still very different from the European market economies. 
However, we proceed with the separate empirical analysis into the factors behind the revealed 
preferences in two groups of countries because of the previous emphasis in the literature that 
post-transition economies exhibit different patterns than old EU members. The choice of 
factors considered to be important predictors for the preferences for higher progressive 
taxation is guided by the literature but limited by the variables available in the questionnaires. 
We include a set of demographic variables considered as traditional predictors for the 
preferences – age, sex, education. Existing research shows that women are more in favor of 
income redistribution than men [12] so we include a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the 
respondent is male. Persons with higher education could, in general, have more information about 
public spending practices and could be more informed about the country’s tax system [37]. Further, 
persons who are more informed about the tax system might be more comfortable with the current 
distribution of taxes [38, 39]. To capture this, we create a series of dummy variables referring to 
persons’ educational attainment. We distinguish between no formal education, primary, lower 
secondary, upper secondary (reference value), post-secondary (non-tertiary) and tertiary education. 
It is assumed that with age people are more aware of the benefits of government services, 
through the increased need for the security of their pension funds, availability of adequate 
health care and in general increased demand for social protection [19]. People who have lived 
in the pre-transition period might be additionally more inclined to favor a more generous 
welfare system [40]. We include dummy variables for the persons aged 18-25, 26-35, 36-45 
(reference category), 46-55, 56-65 and older than 66. 
People are influenced by their self-interest – they position themselves in a certain income 
group and favor taxes that are more beneficial for this income group [41-43]. In other words, 
if the respondent believes that she is at the lower end of the social scale, the probability that 
she is more sensitive to the tax burden of the lower-income population is higher. Similarly, 
respondents who believe that they belong to the higher income group might consider taxes to 
be too high for middle and high-income groups. To operationalize this issue, we include a 
dummy variable for each decile of self-perceived social status. The middle position in the 
scale is considered as a reference value. 
Unemployed persons might be in favor of progressive taxation because they are aware that 
welfare policies rely on government revenues [44]. We additionally consider employees 
working in the public sector as more in favor of progressive taxation. The underlying 
assumption is that persons working in the public sector might be aware that their wages are 
dependent on government revenues, so they could have different perceptions related to the tax 
burden. In each case, if a person has responded to be in any of the statuses described above, 
the value of the variable takes value 1. 
Trade unions participate in wage negotiations and frequently need to motivate their members 
to take some actions. In this process, they could gently persuade their members to slightly 
modify their original views. This is not to say that unions are in general pro or against certain 
models of taxation, but it could be the case that taxation policy fits into the current wage 
negotiations process to some extent. The members could be more informed either about the 
current state of the taxation system or announced reforms, than persons who are not union members. 
We included a dummy variable taking value 1 if a person is currently a trade union member. 
Previous research has documented that political preferences are directly related to the degree 
of preferences for the role of government. Left-wing individuals support the stronger role of 
the government, while right-wing individuals believe that less government involvement is 
needed [34]. These aspirations are not only relevant on a general level, but political parties 
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very frequently address specific population subgroups they consider to be their main pool of 
voters. Thus, political orientation can be an indicator of additional sensitivity towards specific 
population subgroup and persons can be more or less sensitive towards the tax burden of a 
specific population subgroup. We include the following dummy variables: far left, left, center 
(reference value), right and far-right.  
Studies have also found that people who in general have higher trust in government are more 
likely to be in favour of progressive taxation [45] based on the assumption that citizens trust 
government to perform fair redistribution. Respondents were asked to assess whether people 
should obey the law without exception (and we include this by incorporating the dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if they responded positively to this question). The argument is 
that if they, in general, believe that the legal system is appropriate, they would be more in 
favor of progressive taxation because they can see the rationale for the use of funds. On the 
opposite side, if citizens believe that political corruption is widespread, they are more likely to 
consider that the funds collected through the taxes are misplaced. To capture political 
corruption perception, we include a dummy variable taking value 1 if a person believes that 
quite a lot or almost all politicians are involved in corruption. 
Following the literature on decoupling between the desire for more redistribution and the 
perception of an already high tax burden [17, 19] we include a variable that captures the 
perceptions on the current state in the country. Tax level variable is the average of assessment (5 
points Likert scale from 1 – much too low, to 5 – much too high) of the current tax burden for 
all income groups (low, middle and high income). Thus, the higher the average, the more a 
person believes that the current tax level in the country is already high. 
Institutional settings differ among the countries. The existing institutional setting affects 
people’s expectations. For example, if the education or pension system is mostly provided by 
the private sector, citizens will not consider the increased need for funding these systems 
related to the redistributive role of the government. To capture institutional differences 
between the countries, we include country dummy variables. 
We analyze two groups of countries separately, applying the same methodology. As a first 
step in the analysis, we perform correlation analysis to check for multicollinearity (Table 2 in 
the Appendix), with the result that the correlation between independent variables is low. Since 
our dependent variable is binary (whether a person is in favor of more progressive taxation 
equals 1, otherwise equals 0), we estimate a probit model. Specifically, we estimate the 
following equations in two separate periods (2006 and 2016). 
The equation for Old European countries is following (indexing omitted for a clearer 
presentation): 
𝑃𝑟(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 = 1)
= 𝛷(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑔𝑒18 − 25 + 𝛽2𝑎𝑔𝑒26 − 35 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑔𝑒46 − 55
+ 𝛽4𝑎𝑔𝑒56 − 65 + 𝛽5𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽6𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 − 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 + 𝛽7𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦
+ 𝛽8𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽9𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 − 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽10𝑜𝑏𝑒𝑦 − 𝑙𝑎𝑤
+ 𝛽11𝑡𝑎𝑥 − 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 + 𝛽12𝑛𝑜𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽13𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽14𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 − 𝑠𝑒𝑐
+ 𝛽15𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑠𝑒𝑐 + 𝛽16𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽17𝑓𝑎𝑟 − 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽18𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽19𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡
+ 𝛽20𝑓𝑎𝑟 − 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽21𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑠1 + 𝛽22𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑠2 + 𝛽23𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑠3 + 𝛽24𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑠4
+ 𝛽25𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑠6 + 𝛽26𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑠7 + 𝛽27𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑠8 + 𝛽28𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑠9 + 𝛽29𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑠10 + 𝛽30𝐷𝐾
+ 𝛽31𝐹𝐼 + 𝛽32𝐸𝑆 + 𝛽33𝐹𝑅 + 𝛽34𝑆𝐸) 
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The equation for New European countries is the following: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 = 1)
= 𝛷(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑔𝑒18 − 25 + 𝛽2𝑎𝑔𝑒26 − 35 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑔𝑒46 − 55
+ 𝛽4𝑎𝑔𝑒56 − 65 + 𝛽5𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽6𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 − 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 + 𝛽7𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦
+ 𝛽8𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽9𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 − 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽10𝑜𝑏𝑒𝑦 − 𝑙𝑎𝑤
+ 𝛽11𝑡𝑎𝑥 − 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 + 𝛽12𝑛𝑜𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽13𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽14𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 − 𝑠𝑒𝑐
+ 𝛽15𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑠𝑒𝑐 + 𝛽16𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽17𝑓𝑎𝑟 − 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽18𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽19𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡
+ 𝛽20𝑓𝑎𝑟 − 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽21𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑠1 + 𝛽22𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑠2 + 𝛽23𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑠3 + 𝛽24𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑠4
+ 𝛽25𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑠6 + 𝛽26𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑠7 + 𝛽27𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑠8 + 𝛽28𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑠9 + 𝛽29𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑠10 + 𝛽30𝐶𝑍
+ 𝛽31𝐻𝑅 + 𝛽32𝐿𝑉 + 𝛽33𝑆𝐼 
For ease of interpretation, the marginal effects are presented in the next section. The full set of 
estimated coefficients of the probit models and accompanied diagnostics are in Table 3 in the 
Appendix. 
RESULTS 
Based on the methodology described above, we present the marginal effects of the estimates 
in Table 1. Estimated coefficients, robust standard errors and diagnostics of the underlying 
probit models are in Table 3 in the Appendix. 
From the results presented in Table 3 in the Appendix, we can note that the numbers of 
observations as well as the overall fit of the estimates are higher for Old European countries 
than for New Europe. This would suggest that in New Europe there are additional variables 
not included in the present analysis that could offer additional insights on why the citizens are 
in favor of more progressive taxation.  
Table 1. Revealed preferences for progressive taxation, marginal effects (continued on p.336). 
VARIABLES 
2006 2016 
New EU Old EU New EU OLD EU 
Age 
age 18_25 –0,0140 –0,0442* –0,0324 –0,0609** 
 
(0,0244) (0,0237) (0,0275) (0,0277) 
age 26_35 –0,00735 –0,0216 0,0149 –0,0477** 
 
(0,0228) (0,0188) (0,0223) (0,0227) 
age 46_55 0,0400* 0,0364** 0,0799*** 0,0658*** 
 
(0,0213) (0,0174) (0,0203) (0,0190) 
age 56_65 0,0724*** 0,0836*** 0,0706*** 0,0955*** 
 
(0,0216) (0,0176) (0,0208) (0,0188) 
age 66 0,0575** 0,112*** 0,0733*** 0,137*** 
 
(0,0237) (0,0181) (0,0224) (0,0183) 
Gender 
Male –0,0104 –0,0243** –0,0270* –0,0121 
 
(0,0138) (0,0113) (0,0140) (0,0124) 
Work status 
public_worker 0,0424*** 0,0314** 0,00374 0,0372*** 
 
(0,0156) (0,0136) (0,0161) (0,0139) 
unemployed –0,00638 0,0509** –0,00788 0,0256 
 
(0,0289) (0,0257) (0,0273) (0,0290) 
current_union_member 0,0216 0,0317** –0,0228 0,0375** 
 
(0,0230) (0,0152) (0,0262) (0,0156) 
Trust in 
government 
political_corruption 0,0992*** 0,0441*** 0,0360** 0,0155 
 
(0,0144) (0,0133) (0,0156) (0,0163) 
obey_law 0,00197 –0,0125 –0,0179 0,0132 
 
(0,0138) (0,0122) (0,0143) (0,0130) 
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Table 1. Revealed preferences for progressive taxation, marginal effects (continuation from 
p.335). Standard errors as well as diagnostics are reported in Table 2 in the Appendix. 
Perceptions on 
the current tax 
level 
tax_level 0,201*** 0,124*** 0,201*** 0,207*** 
 
(0,0156) (0,0110) (0,0165) (0,0143) 
Education 
No education –0,0377 0,00884 –0,0985 –0,0800 
 
(0,0474) (0,0333) (0,105) (0,0517) 
primary 0,00891 0,0657*** –0,0549 0,0738*** 
 
(0,0205) (0,0194) (0,0910) (0,0284) 
lower_sec 0,0493*** 0,0805*** 0,00736 0,0534** 
 
(0,0182) (0,0170) (0,0170) (0,0212) 
post_sec –0,00608 –0,0515*** –0,0324 0,0131 
 
(0,0289) (0,0196) (0,0296) (0,0232) 
tertiary –0,0660*** –0,0956*** –0,0186 –0,0635*** 
 
(0,0251) (0,0203) (0,0206) (0,0194) 
Political 
orientation 
far_left 0,0355 0,172*** 0,147*** 0,125*** 
 
(0,0355) (0,0196) (0,0383) (0,0206) 
left –0,0453** 0,0919*** 0,0410** 0,106*** 
 
(0,0217) (0,0133) (0,0207) (0,0154) 
right –0,0307 –0,128*** 0,00231 –0,0962*** 
 
(0,0191) (0,0161) (0,0177) (0,0167) 
far_right –0,0659 –0,0497 –0,0562 0,0355 
 
(0,0667) (0,0376) (0,0581) (0,0269) 
Self-perceived 
social status 
spss1 0,0612* 0,120*** –0,0219 0,128*** 
 
(0,0350) (0,0434) (0,0537) (0,0415) 
spss2 0,0462 0,105*** 0,0215 0,121*** 
 
(0,0295) (0,0343) (0,0453) (0,0396) 
spss3 0,0408* 0,0268 0,0448* 0,0784*** 
 
(0,0217) (0,0242) (0,0257) (0,0274) 
spss4 0,0516*** 0,0254 0,0503** 0,0459** 
 
(0,0190) (0,0198) (0,0217) (0,0226) 
spss6 0,00234 –0,0538*** –0,0152 –0,0227 
 
(0,0209) (0,0160) (0,0209) (0,0183) 
spss7 –0,00963 –0,137*** –0,0359 –0,0775*** 
 
(0,0268) (0,0198) (0,0230) (0,0201) 
spss8 –0,0371 –0,171*** –0,0801** –0,145*** 
 
(0,0394) (0,0253) (0,0335) (0,0246) 
spss9 –0,157* –0,306*** –0,123* –0,222*** 
 
(0,0947) (0,0481) (0,0704) (0,0481) 
spss10 –0,0623 –0,276*** –0,0451 –0,212*** 
 
(0,133) (0,0692) (0,0816) (0,0720) 
Country 
dummies 
Country dummies – 
New Europe 
Yes No Yes No 
Country dummies – 
Old Europe 
No Yes No Yes 
*statistically significant at 10 % 
**statistically significant at 5 % 
***statistically significant at 1 % 
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AGE AND PREFERENCES FOR MORE PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 
Our results confirm predictions that older citizens will be more inclined towards progressive 
taxation. However, the comparison of estimated marginal effects between Old and New 
Europe does not suggest that this is more pronounced in post-transition economies. The 
average results obtained through the estimation conceal the heterogeneous dynamics within 
the countries. Figure 2 presents cohorts according to their age in the year 1990 and depicts 
changes in their attitudes towards progressive taxation between 2006 and 2016. Only in the 
case of Latvia, we can see that the cohorts that have lived longer under the socialist system are 
through time (as their demand for government services increases) voicing stronger preferences 
for more progressive taxation. Within Old Europe, France is an interesting case where older 
cohorts are less likely to be in favor of more progressive taxation and this dislike increases in 
the period after 2008 crisis. 
 
Figure 2. Changes in attitudes towards more progressive taxation between 2006 and 2016, 
according to the cohorts’ age group in 1990 [35, 36]. 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCEPTIONS OF CURRENT TAX LEVEL AND 
PREFERENCE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 
Another important result that we have found across the country groups and analyzed periods 
is that those in favor of more progressive taxation are also more likely to consider that the 
existing tax burden is already high. This apparently illogical result is explained in the 
literature with the notion that while citizens might be in favor of redistribution, they are less 
likely to support the same views when confronted with the specific situation [46]. Since 
demand for government services is often greater than the willingness to pay for them [47] 
when individuals are confronted to prioritize between different government expenditures, 
research shows that they express high levels of support for the increase in expenditures on 
education [48]. In our case, it could be illustrated with the desire to cut government spending. 
In general, the desire to reduce government spending is higher in the analyzed New European 
economies than in Old European economies, with the exception of France (Figure 3). 
However, there is no correlation with the current perceived level of taxation or with the desire 
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Figure 3. Share of respondents in favor of more progressive taxation and less government 
spending [35]. 
TRUST IN GOVERNMENT AND PREFERENCES FOR MORE PROGRESSIVE 
TAXATION 
Another frequently discussed feature of post-transition societies is relatively high (perception 
of) corruption. In accordance with the assumptions, this factor is more important for people’s 
attitudes towards more progressive taxation in post-transition economies than in Old European 
countries. Indeed, it becomes non-significant for Old member states in the period after the 
financial crisis. It is, however, not clear what are the mechanisms that link the perception of 
corruption to favoring more progressive taxation. It could be the case that due to high 
influence of the government in the society as well as political corruption, there is an expressed 
preference for the decrease of these aspects of government. This also puts in doubt the fairness 
of the existing redistributive system, since the desire for more progressive taxation is the 
result of both self-interest and fairness motives [49]. If citizens are more in favor of 
redistribution, but at the same time believe that the current system is not delivering due to 
corruption, the correlation of two variables might not capture the causation effect properly. 
Thus, to confirm such assumptions for this complex issue, a more detailed survey focused on the 
post-transition economies should be performed. 
WORK STATUS AND PREFERENCES FOR MORE PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 
Surprisingly, inability to earn for a living, as indicated by the respondent’s unemployment 
status, was a significant predictor for more progressive taxation preferences only in the case 
of Old Member States prior to the 2008 crisis. The fact that it was not found important in 
other specifications is probably related to the fact that with the rise of unemployment as a 
consequence of the crisis, a certain proportion of the unemployed lost faith in the 
redistributive power of the government. Vanishing support of public workers for more 
progressive taxation in New Members after the crisis could also be attributed to the austerity 
measures many governments took, typical ones being decreasing (or freezing) the public 
sector wages and reducing or prohibiting new public sector employment. 
Different tax preferences? Old vs. New Europe 
339 
EDUCATION AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION IN RELATION TO PREFERENCES 
FOR MORE PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 
While in term of education there seems to be a similarity between Old and New Europe, there 
are no such similarities when it comes to political parties. The preferences in Old Europe are 
consistent with the expectations – left-oriented voters are more in favor of progressive 
taxation, while right-oriented voters oppose such intentions. However, the situation is not that 
simple in New Europe. Although beyond the scope of this specific article, the result is 
probably related to the fact that political parties in Eastern Europe have still not been 
associated with specific economic policies and measures, but the predominate political 
discussion still revolves around the communist legacy. 
SELF-PERCEIVED SOCIAL STATUS AND PREFERENCES FOR PROGRESSIVE 
TAXATION 
Finally, our results suggest that both within Old and within New Europe, those with higher 
self-perceived social status are usually against more taxation, while those with lower self-
perceived social status are in favor of redistribution. Thus, certain social tensions exist in both 
groups of countries. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, union membership is significantly 
associated with an inclination towards more progressive taxation in Old EU, but not in post-
transition economies. This could be a direct consequence of the trade unions transformation 
through the transition process [50] from a virtually monopolistic role to the competition for 
the union membership. 
According to results, it seems that differences between the Old and New Europe are rather 
small and that there are much more similarities than differences in factors predicting tax 
burden preferences. At one side, our results confirm the arguments that there is a convergence 
of tax burden preferences in Old and New Europe [51]. On the other side, our results also 
suggest that there are still important heterogeneities within Old and within New European 
member states. 
DISCUSSION AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS 
Our research results contribute to the previous literature on tax preferences of European 
citizens. On the aggregate level, we have confirmed previous findings on the heterogeneity of 
the citizens’ preferences for government redistributive policies [29]. Although some studies 
suggest that there are important factors leading to the special position of the post-transition 
countries [2-4], we were not able to detect any unambiguous pattern emerging in the more 
recent period. This prompted a hypothesis of preferences’ convergence. Although there is still 
a possibility of harmonizing effects stemming from the European Union, we were not able to clearly 
document the convergence process. We suspect that the period under analysis in the present 
paper is too short for convergence factors to have a dominant effect on the underlying processes. 
We have explored a variety of factors contributing to the personal preferences for the 
redistributive role of the government. Following previous literature [12], our results confirm 
that personal characteristics, such as age, are important predictors of tax preferences. 
However, while studies that rely on earlier datasets [1] suggest that the longer a cohort lived 
under communism, the more it sees redistribution as an important task of the government, our 
results do not point in that direction. We believe that since our sample is more recent, the 
effects of living under a socialist regime have been worn-out. 
Another important socioeconomic characteristic is the educational attainment of the 
respondent. The literature suggests that higher the level of education is, the more person is 
informed about the current tax system [37] and is more supportive of the existing redistribution 
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mechanisms [39]. On the other hand, higher education is frequently associated with higher 
income. Persons in the higher-income group favor taxes beneficial for their income group [43]. 
Based on these findings, we would expect that persons with the education level less than 
upper secondary (a reference group in our estimation) are more in favor of progressive 
taxation, while those with education higher than upper secondary would be more against. Our 
results are in line with the expectations, in particular in the case of older European Union 
members where the estimates are consistently significant in the period before and after 2008 
crisis. For New member states, the pattern disappears after the crisis. We suspect that the 
labor market distortions as a consequence of crisis were more severe in New member states. 
This latter finding is somewhat supported by our results related to the work status of the 
respondents. For New member states, we did not find any significance of unemployment or 
union membership. Even though the literature suggests that unemployed persons might be 
more in favor of progressive taxation [44] we suggest that in case of post-transition societies 
the restructuring process created large pools of discouraged workers. In these circumstances, 
the role of the government becomes illusive, because the effects of redistribution policies are 
not directly observed. Since unemployed persons are not actually receiving income, they might 
favor certain policies in general, but do not experience the effects of the policy measures directly. 
This is somewhat related to the self-perceived social status, where the literature suggests that 
the income group a person is self-identified with would be the target group for evaluating 
government policy actions [41, 42] In this respect, our results are in line with the literature – 
those with lower income are more in favor of more progressive taxation, while those with 
higher income are against more progressive taxation because they expect the effect of the 
redistribution will be at their cost. Although general patterns are the same in both groups of 
countries, the significance is generally more apparent in Old EU member states. This would 
imply that this pattern is fully developed in market economies, but in post-transition 
economies, a different view of the redistributive role of the government might still linger on. 
Different factors can affect such result – from the specificities of the wage bargaining system 
to the amount of public services provided by the government sector. This issue deserves 
deeper inspection on a country level and cannot be assessed jointly for a group of countries. 
A similar argument can be expressed for the political orientation of the individuals. Literature 
generally claims that left-wing oriented individuals are, in general, supporters for the stronger 
role of the government [34]. Our findings support the literature in the case of Old EU member 
states. However, in the case of post-transition countries, this pattern cannot be observed. We 
speculate that this is because the political spectrum, in general, is not focused on the economic 
issues or the role of government. For example, contrary to expectations, in Croatia, it is the 
right-wing oriented government that is associated with increased pressure to government 
budget related to the specific demands from the interest groupings such as war veterans. 
Presented results can be associated with several contributions to the literature. First, we have 
clearly documented that heterogeneities between the countries regarding the redistributive 
role of the government persist even in the period after the global financial crisis [5]. Second, 
although post-transition countries differ between themselves, they in many aspects resemble 
their more market-oriented EU members. Specifically, it seems that taxation policy in each 
country as well as other aspects of the functioning of the economy and probably government 
sector, in particular, are more relevant than personal characteristics for the formation of 
individuals’ preferences for more progressive taxation. 
In general, we have documented that the factors contributing to the preference for a more 
redistributive role of the government are similar in post-transition and market economies. It is 
interesting to note that across all the country groupings and all the periods, we have confirmed 
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that even though individuals believe that general tax level is high [39, 52] they are still supporting 
more progressive taxation. We suggest that this is related to the perceived quality of services 
provided by the government sector. It could be the case that the citizens would not oppose 
higher taxation, had they been convinced that the government can organize fair redistribution. 
Important limitations of the results presented in this article are related to the data source used 
for the empirical analysis. Although comparative datasets suitable for exploring different 
aspects of preferences for redistribution systems are scarce, we do believe that ISSP provides 
a good basis for analyzing this set of research questions. Even though it can be argued that 
preferences are not easily changed and that factors contributing to preference formation could 
be more or less stable, we still strongly believe that there are some global incidences capable 
to cause significant disturbances in preferences for the redistributive role of government. One 
example has been implicitly covered by our analysis – the global financial crisis. However, 
even more distortive effect is expected in the aftermath of the global pandemic crisis. Thus, 
there is a need for a more frequent collection of data to be able to promptly capture the effects. 
Another concern is directly related to our results, but also to findings from previous research. 
Specifically, we have confirmed important heterogeneities between the countries. Still, our 
analysis does not include all European Union members. In order to explore the possibilities of 
convergence within the European Union, it would be preferable to obtain a dataset covering all 
the countries. 
Regardless of these constraints, we believe that our results can be associated with some 
practical implications. First, we believe that this is an important research question in the future 
discussions on the possibilities of a fiscal union within Europe. However, we acknowledge the 
low probability that the fiscal union issue will be determined in a nearby future. The issue of 
disharmonizing preferences for different types of taxations will probably arise sooner in the 
context of sharing the economic consequences of the global pandemic. It has been seen that 
such questions have been raised in the context of the issuance of COVID-19 related EU 
bonds. In order to provide adequate policy measures, government officials must be presented 
with relevant research results based on the most recent dataset covering all EU countries. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of the article is to analyze the perceptions of the EU citizens on the existing tax 
burden and preferences for more progressive taxation. In acknowledgement of the specific 
role that history, culture, political ideology and a perception of fairness have in determining 
personal attitudes towards inequalities, we separately analyze New and Old Member States. 
The specific contribution of the article lies in the documentation of the evolution of 
preferences for more progressive taxation in post-transition economies. Another contribution 
is related to the comparative inspection of the factors contributing to preferences in post-
transition European economies relative to the established market European economies. The 
time dimension of the data, furthermore, enables discussion of potential convergence of 
preferences between Old and New European member states. 
Although the period of ten years is relatively short when analyzing the formation of 
preferences, the specific period analyzed in this article entails a disruptive episode connected 
to the effects of the global financial crisis. The crisis itself was associated with austerity 
measures proposed by many governments. Yet, we did not find any systematic differences in 
the preferences or their factors, in the period before and after the crisis. 
Contrary to some previous findings, we do not find the effect of the socialist legacy system in 
New Europe, in a way that older cohorts experiencing life in a previously presumably more 
generous and egalitarian system would be disproportionally more in favor of progressive 
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taxation than the same age cohorts in Old Europe [40]. We also do not find that political 
orientation in New Europe supports the traditional left-orientation-more government pattern 
that can be found in the data for Old Europe. We also do not find the important contribution 
of the trade unions membership for progressive taxation and the higher redistributive role of 
the government in the New EU. Thus, although the overall patterns of tax preferences are 
predominately under the influence of a specific country redistributive policies and the scope 
of services the government provides, the analysis of factors behind aggregate results provided 
interesting insights into specific features of the post-transition societies. Our findings do 
corroborate the notion that there is heterogeneity between the countries [5], but there are no 
specific traits of post-transition societies in that respect. 
The issue of rising income inequalities and the appropriate role of the government featured 
many recent public debates on the global level. For the European Union, the importance of 
these topics is additionally related to the question of potential future harmonization of fiscal 
policies. Results presented in this study emphasize the heterogeneity of European citizens 
when it comes to their preferences for more progressive taxation. It has been clearly 
documented that almost every country has its specificities. Thus, the path towards the 
common fiscal policies in a unified Europe is very likely to be a long and winding one. 
Limitations of the findings are related to the dataset used. While it is the most recent ISSP 
study on the role of government, at the time of performing the analysis it has already been 
relatively outdated. Certainly, preferences for the role of government have been dramatically 
changed during the COVID-19 crisis in all economies. The full extent of this change is yet to 
be revealed. 
The analysis in this article provides a glimpse into differences for tax preferences of European 
citizens. Certainly, additional research efforts are required. In order to provide specific policy 
recommendations on the European level, the comparable survey should be carried in all 
member states. While the desire to cut government spending is higher in the analyzed New 
European economies, it remains open how to incorporate the detrimental influence of 
corruption on the citizens’ desire for more progressive taxation. This issue is left for future 
research endeavors. 
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Table 3. Probit estimates, probability to favor progressive taxation (continued on pp.352-353). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Variables 
2006 2016  
New EU Old EU New EU Old EU 
 Constant –1,250*** -0,234** -0,846*** -0,724*** 
 
 
(0,146) (0,105) (0,150) (0,132) 
Age age_18_25 –0,0426 -0,117* -0,0940 -0,166** 
 
(0,0734) (0,0618) (0,0783) (0,0737) 
age_26_35 –0,0224 -0,0576 0,0444 -0,131** 
 
(0,0692) (0,0498) (0,0674) (0,0613) 
age_46_55 0,126* 0,0990** 0,248*** 0,191*** 
 
(0,0688) (0,0479) (0,0667) (0,0571) 
age_56_65 0,234*** 0,232*** 0,218*** 0,281*** 
 
(0,0744) (0,0508) (0,0677) (0,0583) 
age_66 0,183** 0,317*** 0,228*** 0,411*** 
 
(0,0790) (0,0539) (0,0734) (0,0595) 
Gender male –0,0318 -0,0652** -0,0800* -0,0341 
 
(0,0423) (0,0304) (0,0416) (0,0349) 
Work 
status 
public_worker 0,131*** 0,0851** 0,0111 0,106*** 
 
(0,0487) (0,0371) (0,0477) (0,0399) 
unemployed –0,0194 0,141* -0,0232 0,0731 
 
(0,0877) (0,0731) (0,0800) (0,0844) 
current_union_member 0,0674 0,0858** -0,0666 0,107** 
 
(0,0731) (0,0413) (0,0754) (0,0450) 
Trust in 
government 
political_corruption 0,299*** 0,120*** 0,106** 0,0437 
 
(0,0428) (0,0364) (0,0455) (0,0463) 
obey_law 0,00603 -0,0335 -0,0528 0,0371 
 





tax_level 0,615*** 0,332*** 0,594*** 0,581*** 
 
(0,0487) (0,0296) (0,0495) (0,0407) 
Education noeducation –0,112 0,0239 –0,273 –0,216 
 
(0,137) (0,0903) (0,275) (0,135) 
primary 0,0274 0,181*** –0,156 0,219** 
 
(0,0635) (0,0548) (0,250) (0,0890) 
lower_sec 0,156*** 0,222*** 0,0218 0,154** 
 
(0,0591) (0,0481) (0,0506) (0,0630) 
post_sec –0,0185 –0,136*** –0,0939 0,0371 
 
(0,0875) (0,0512) (0,0841) (0,0661) 
tertiary –0,193*** –0,251*** –0,0547 –0,177*** 
 
(0,0709) (0,0522) (0,0598) (0,0538) 
Political 
orientation 
far_left 0,113 0,520*** 0,520*** 0,385*** 
 
(0,117) (0,0694) (0,172) (0,0713) 
left –0,135** 0,253*** 0,125* 0,312*** 
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Table 3. Probit estimates, probability to favor progressive taxation (continuation from p.351, 
continued on p.353). Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
(0,0630) (0,0378) (0,0651) (0,0477) 
right –0,0922 –0,334*** 0,00685 –0,263*** 
 
(0,0564) (0,0413) (0,0527) (0,0446) 
far_right –0,191 –0,131 –0,160 0,102 
 






spss1 0,200 0,350** –0,0637 0,406*** 
 
(0,123) (0,140) (0,154) (0,153) 
spss2 0,148 0,303*** 0,0648 0,378*** 
 
(0,0992) (0,107) (0,139) (0,142) 
spss3 0,129* 0,0729 0,137* 0,233*** 
 
(0,0711) (0,0667) (0,0818) (0,0871) 
spss4 0,164*** 0,0691 0,154** 0,133** 
 
(0,0627) (0,0544) (0,0690) (0,0674) 
spss6 0,00718 –0,143*** –0,0445 –0,0632 
 
(0,0641) (0,0421) (0,0609) (0,0508) 
spss7 –0,0293 –0,355*** –0,104 –0,212*** 
 
(0,0809) (0,0503) (0,0654) (0,0536) 
spss8 –0,110 –0,440*** –0,225** –0,385*** 
 
(0,114) (0,0639) (0,0902) (0,0631) 
spss9 –0,434* –0,788*** –0,336* –0,575*** 
 
(0,243) (0,131) (0,182) (0,121) 
spss10 –0,181 –0,707*** –0,129 –0,549*** 
 




















































































 Observations 4,577 8,144 4,509 6,781 
 LogLikelihood –2465 –4707 –2499 –3596 
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Table 3. Probit estimates, probability to favor progressive taxation (continuation from 
pp.351-352). Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Pseudo R2 0,0926 0,122 0,0924 0,176 
Wald chi2 425,6*** 1154*** 464,1*** 1210*** 
Sensitivity (%) 95,57 86,51 93,7 87,73 
Specificity (%) 21,48 42,49 22,93 48,89 
Pearson chi2 4634,04*** 8032,78*** 4509,11*** 6953,72*** 
Hosmer-Lemeshow 39,74*** 19,43*** 30,92*** 35,93*** 
*statistically significant at 10 % 
**statistically significant at 5 % 
***statistically significant at 1 % 
REMARKS 
1
The dataset used, as well as complete documentation including the questionnaires in national 
languages, is available here: https://www.gesis.org/issp/modules/issp-modules-by-topic/role-
of-government/2006. 
2
The dataset used, as well as complete documentation including the questionnaires in national 
languages, is available here: https://www.gesis.org/issp/modules/issp-modules-by-topic/role-
of-government/2016. 
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